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A key element of leadership is the decision to shoulder responsibility for the welfare of others, whether they 
are one’s family, a political party, or, as with heads of state, the entire country. In animal groups such as fish 
shoals or bird flocks, leadership may passively result from simple coordination principles (1, 2). By contrast, 
human leaders often actively make decisions on behalf of others. Although previous work has identified 
factors that predict those who will end up as leaders (3), it remains unclear how leaders decide to shoulder 
responsibility. On page XXX of this issue, Edelson et al. (4) provide further understanding on the 
psychological and neural processes engaged when someone decides to lead. They show that such 
decisions are intimately linked to our confidence in making decisions for others. 
Edelson et al. asked volunteers to decide whether to accept or reject a series of risky lotteries for points 
(such as a 60% chance of winning 50 points set against a 40% chance of losing 30 points) that were 
converted to a monetary bonus. These types of lottery problems can be used to estimate baseline decision-
making such as risk and loss aversion. Participants were then faced with the same lotteries as part of a four-
person group, whom they had gotten to know in a series of team-building games. In a clever design, there 
were two types of scenario in this phase: Half of the decisions only affected the earnings of the participant, 
whereas the other half also affected the earnings of the other group members. Mimicking a classic leadership 
dilemma, participants had the opportunity to defer their decision to the other group members instead of 
taking it on themselves. Perhaps because people were reluctant to shoulder responsibility, deferral rates 
were highest when decisions had consequences for the earnings of others. 
Before the experiment, the same volunteers completed a questionnaire to measure leadership. 
Furthermore, because the study was conducted in Switzerland, where military service is mandatory for 
males, the researchers could record the actual military rank attained by some of their participants—a real-
world measure of leadership experience. Interestingly, none of the decision-making indicators obtained in 
the baseline task predicted leadership. Nor did the overall tendency to prefer to take control of whether to 
accept or reject the lottery. Instead, the best predictor was a change in the rate of deferring when the decision 
had consequences for others—what Edelson et al. call “responsibility aversion.” Responsibility aversion was 
the lowest in those with the highest leadership scores, indicating that leaders did not change their behavior, 
despite the additional responsibility for others’ welfare. 
What mechanisms might underpin responsibility aversion? Recent progress in models of perceptual 
decision-making provide useful hints. One idea is that the decision to defer to the group is similar to a process 
of “opting out” of a choice when the evidence is not sufficiently strong (5, 6). This process can be modeled 
by using signal detection theory (7), a framework in which an individual compares noisy evidence about a 
stimulus to an internal threshold. When there is insufficient evidence for either choice option – that is, when 
confidence is low – the model predicts people will tend to opt-out or defer to others. If the threshold becomes 
more conservative when the decision is being made on behalf of the group, fewer decisions to lead will be 
taken, despite the subjective value of the gamble remaining constant.  
An alternative model is that responsibility aversion is driven by how the value of a gamble is perceived—
for instance, we might become more loss averse when the outcome of other group members is at stake, 
making the choice options seem less attractive. By comparing the fits of different models to their data, 
Edelson et al. found that, while the subjective value of gambles did not change between self and group 
scenarios, the deferral thresholds did. 
It remains unknown what drives this greater demand for certainty when others’ welfare is at stake, but 
several hypotheses suggest a rich seam of future work. One possibility is that a psychological cost of leading 
directly modulates the thresholds. An alternative account is that estimates of one’s own ability, known as 
metacognitive beliefs, come into play when others’ welfare is at stake (8). For instance, individuals might 
feel less able to make decisions for others, which would manifest as a shift in deferral thresholds. Relating 
leadership characteristics to other measures of confidence (such as opt-out behavior) could uncover such 
relationships. 
Edelson et al. also collected whole-brain functional magnetic resonance imaging data during the deferral 
task. Although exploratory, this analysis identified a network that helped to predict responsibility aversion 
and leadership scores across individuals. In particular, a dynamic causal model identified links between 
medial prefrontal cortex—previously shown to encode both subjective value and confidence (9)—and 
anterior insula as important regions of the brain that mediate leadership decisions. In turn, this connectivity 
was modulated by temporal lobe regions commonly implicated in thinking about others. Future studies are 
now needed to ask how the elements of the signal-detection model relate to activity of the nodes in this 
network. 
Edelson et al. found that responsibility aversion was the best predictor of leadership scores. But a 
question of causality remains. People with low responsibility aversion may be more likely to become leaders; 
alternatively, leaders may have low responsibility aversion because they have substantial experience 
making choices on behalf of others. More broadly, the authors found that responsibility aversion did not 
correlate with the classic “big five” personality traits such as neuroticism or extraversion. However, data-
driven approaches to quantifying personality may prove more informative, particularly given links between 
psychopathology and metacognitive beliefs (10). 
It remains to be seen whether a similar approach can predict variation in leadership style, such as 
autocratic or democratic leadership, and identify those who will be good leaders (11). In the study of Edelson 
et al., participants with low responsibility aversion did not earn more money for the group. By using the tools 
of decision neuroscience, it may be possible to reverse engineer not only leadership decisions, but also the 
ingredients of good leadership. 
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